Global Shift, Territorial Crisis
Digital infrastructures, ecological limits and the Mediterranean as a system in transition
Author: Monica Bianco, Ecosystems Cooperation advisor -CRF Italy
Abstract
The postwar architecture of global cooperation is undergoing a deep reconfiguration, driven by three interlinked transformations: digital infrastructure expansion, ecological constraints, and geopolitical multipolarity. This article situates the Mediterranean region within this global transition, identifying it as both a frontline of systemic crisis and a potential site of institutional innovation. Far from being a peripheral arena, the Mediterranean now reflects the broader contradictions of a model of development based on linear extraction, territorial disconnection, and geopolitical segmentation. The article traces the historical trajectory of cooperation in the region, examines current vulnerabilities and fragmentation, and suggests that new territorial governance strategies are needed to address a reality shaped by interconnected risks and distributed capacities.
Introduction: Cooperation in a Disrupted World
The classical model of international cooperation—based on stable donor–recipient relations, centralized institutions, and project-based interventions—was born in a world of geopolitical order, state-centric development, and resource abundance. That world no longer exists. Today, cooperation unfolds in a scenario of systemic transition, where the institutional, material, and technological foundations of development are being reconfigured.
The Mediterranean exemplifies this shift. Once a geopolitical buffer and development periphery, it is now a site of overlapping crises: climate vulnerability, migration pressure, resource degradation, democratic erosion, and digital asymmetry. As a boundary space between Europe, MENA, and Africa, the region highlights the fractures of a model based on disconnection between economies, knowledge, and ecological systems.
To understand the implications for cooperation, we must analyze three intersecting forces that define the current landscape: digital infrastructures as new enablers of power and asymmetry; ecological constraints as systemic limits to growth; and the Mediterranean as a strategic interface in the emerging multipolar order.
Digital Infrastructures and Territorial Disarticulation
The digital transformation is reshaping not only economies but also the architecture of global influence. Control over platforms, data, and infrastructure now defines strategic advantage. As Srnicek notes, “platforms are not neutral intermediaries; they are extractive infrastructures that reorganize entire sectors” [1].
In the Mediterranean, this asymmetry is visible in the uneven distribution of connectivity, data centers, cloud services, and digital sovereignty. North–South divides in digital infrastructure reinforce structural dependencies. Countries in North Africa and the Levant are often forced to adopt imported platforms, standards, and architectures, with limited capacity to design or govern them.
This disarticulates territories from digital value chains. As Taylor and Broeders argue, “data infrastructures produce new forms of spatial marginalization, where sovereignty is partial and externalized” [2]. Meanwhile, digital development cooperation remains fragmented and focused on superficial access (e.g., broadband penetration, e-government) rather than territorial capability-building.
Ecological Constraints and the End of Linear Development
The Mediterranean is a hotspot of ecological vulnerability. According to the IPCC and the Union for the Mediterranean, the region is warming 20% faster than the global average, facing declining water availability, biodiversity loss, and increased risk of systemic drought [3]. These dynamics challenge the viability of development models based on linear growth, export agriculture, fossil fuel extraction, and urban sprawl.
Yet cooperation frameworks continue to promote these same models, often under greenwashed labels like “sustainable modernization.” Development banks fund infrastructure disconnected from ecological carrying capacity, while adaptation strategies remain sectoral and project-bound.
As Raworth argues, “we are entering the doughnut era, where development must operate between social foundations and ecological ceilings” [4]. This demands a shift from productivity to resilience, from extraction to regeneration, from export-led growth to territorial circularity.
The Mediterranean is emblematic: it faces systemic limits—water stress, coastal erosion, energy fragility—without the governance tools to respond at the appropriate scale.
A Multipolar and Fragmented Geopolitical Space
The post-1945 order was defined by bipolar and then unipolar structures of influence. Today, we are witnessing the rise of a multipolar order in which regional powers—Turkey, Egypt, Gulf countries, the EU—compete and cooperate in unstable configurations.
The Mediterranean sits at the intersection of these realignments. Traditional powers (France, Italy, the EU) face declining legitimacy; meanwhile, China invests through infrastructure diplomacy, and Gulf states fund religious, economic, and media networks. Migration, energy interdependence, and security concerns further complicate relations.
This pluralization of power has not produced a new cooperative architecture. Rather, it has led to fragmented diplomacy, where projects are aligned with shifting strategic interests rather than territorial needs. Regional institutions such as the Union for the Mediterranean remain weak, with limited capacity to define shared strategies or coordinate interventions.
As Achcar observes, “the Arab Mediterranean is caught between global dependency and internal fragmentation, lacking an integrative project” [5].
The Mediterranean as a System in Transition
Taken together, these dynamics—digital disarticulation, ecological constraint, geopolitical fragmentation—reveal the Mediterranean as a system in transition. It is not merely a geographical zone, but a contested space of redefinition, where the old development grammar no longer works, and new forms of cooperation have yet to emerge.
Yet this crisis also creates space for institutional experimentation. New forms of territorial diplomacy, digital commons, regenerative economies, and cross-border platforms are beginning to emerge from below. Examples include inter-municipal cooperation, living labs, and grassroots networks for water governance and agroecology.
These remain marginal—but they reveal a possible shift from project logics to systemic strategies: not isolated interventions, but infrastructures of coordination, learning, and mutualization across borders.
Conclusion: Cooperation in a World of Limits
The era of cooperation as linear expansion, external funding, and technical fixes is over. In the Mediterranean, this reality is no longer theoretical—it is material, ecological, and territorial. The region embodies the limits of an exhausted model and the urgency of inventing new forms of distributed, embedded, and circular cooperation.
Rather than treating the Mediterranean as a problem to manage, cooperation actors must recognize it as a prototype space for systemic transition. This demands a rethinking of scales, instruments, and institutions—toward a model where digital infrastructure enables autonomy, ecological intelligence shapes development, and territorial actors regain strategic agency.
References
- Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform Capitalism. Polity Press.
- Taylor, L., & Broeders, D. (2015). “In the Name of Development: Power, Profit and the Datafication of the Global South.” Geoforum, 64.
- Cramer, W., Guiot, J., & Marini, K. (2018). Climate and Environmental Change in the Mediterranean Basin—Current Situation and Risks for the Future. MedECC Report.
- Raworth, K. (2017). Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist. Random House.
Achcar, G. (2013). The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising. University of California Press.
